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Schizophrenia as a Transformative Evaluative Concept: Perspectives on the Psychiatric 




Psychiatric diagnosis serves many functions in the struggle for recognition, such as access to 
public mental health systems and legal compensation, but it is not necessarily well equipped for 
the task of self-understanding (Tekin 2019) and re-configuration of personal values in the 
recovery process – and the likelihood of optimal outcome that is geared to the individual 
person’s quality of life (see May et al 2020). Call this the transformative dimension of recognition in 
the complex journey from diagnosis to therapeutic empathy in the doctor-patient relationship.  
Patients who are diagnosed with a serious and enduring mental health condition often 
find it difficult to make sense of themselves in relation to their psychiatric diagnosis. Specifically, 
they have problems with distinguishing their ‘self’, or ‘who they are’, from their mental disorder 
or diagnosis (Radden 1996; Sadler 2007; Dings & Glas 2020). I argue that what marks out an 
“owned” and, conversely, “disowned” experience (and behaviour) as such is the wider context of 
the subject possessing it seen as a whole person as characterised by a sense of oneself as an agent 
(Marcel, 2003). A variety of phenomenological and theoretical considerations strongly suggest 
that the psychiatric significance of the concept of selfhood is helpfully understood holistically by 
the five aspects of agency, identity, trajectory, history and perspective that give us the sense of 
unity and control that generates the subjective sense of self (Neisser, 1988; Sadler 2017). 
Although there are a few proposals in the psychological literature about therapeutic integration 
that resemble this claim (Freud 1914; Radden 1996; Tekin 2016), few have made a general case in 
 
1 Bergqvist, A. (2021). ‘Schizophrenia as a Transformative Evaluative Concept: Perspectives on 
the Psychiatric Significance of the Personal Self in the Ethics of Recognition’. Philosophy, 
Psychiatry and Psychology 28 (2). In print. Please quote from the published article.  
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philosophy of psychiatry for thinking about values in understanding the psychiatric significance of 
the personal self in this way. This commentary is intended as a first step in that direction.  
The contribution of Gilardi and Stanghellini is particularly illuminating in demonstrating 
the significance of the personal self and the role of narrative identity in coming to terms with 
medication and related personal values in the therapeutic process. Consider the dynamic 
reflection on recognition and therapeutic empathy in the philosophical dialogue at play: 
 
Drugs don’t cure. Meaningful relationships do. The recognition I got was instrumental in 
my own taking possession of my condition, and in delivering the same recognition for 
the people around me, starting from my mother and then everyone else. (p. 14). 
 
In what follows I will set to one side the complex question of cure in schizophrenia to allow 
better focus on the interplay of values and relational agency in examining the implicit task of self-
ownership in psychiatry. When Gilardi tries to make sense of his experiences he seems to be 
examining the relationship between his diagnosis and who he is. How should we understand 
this? Gilardi and Stanghellini argue that optimal treatment outcome in psychotherapy ‘cannot 
simply be measured as a diminishing of diagnostically significant symptomatology assessed by 
some rating scale’ (p. 5). The simple reason for assenting to this claim is the recognition that 
therapeutic success also involves complex existential issues surrounding self-ownership, personal 
identity and responsibility in the recovery process, where the notion of self-ownership is framed 
relationally as an ongoing mirroring process between self and others for the future (Jopling 2000; 
Tekin 2011; Bergqvist, 2018).  
So far, so uncontroversial. The harder question that remains is how to balance patient 
values and those of the social context of their environment in assessing diagnostic treatment 
goals; as the authors put it, “should we declare victory upon schizophrenia when a patient is fully 
integrated [in society] and his symptoms under (drug?) control, never mind his underlying grief?” 
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(p.16) Gilardi and Stanghellini’s central question as to whether the clinician must always follow 
through on the idiosyncratic value of the patient in the move from diagnosis to therapeutic 
empathy invites further reflection on the role played by narrative identity and the concept of self 
in recovery (see Schechtman 1996; Goldie 2012; Zahavi 2014). I have argued elsewhere 
(Bergqvist 2020) that we rethink the idea of the “point of view” of the individual patient and the 
wider context of the treatment situation as something that makes relevant facts available to the 
practitioner’s clinical judgment (as opposed to being a determinant of meaning as such). How 
should we understand this?  
The relation between the first-personal aspect of the doctor-patient relationship and 
what we may think of as the wider humanistic aspirations to effect empathy in clinical practice is, 
I think, helpfully understood by comparison with Matthew Ratcliffe’s (2017) suggestion that we 
understand empathy as a form of open-ended exploration in therapeutic intervention. The central 
claim is that the distinctive notion of empathic exploration or ‘openness’ in engaging with the 
other person’s point of view goes beyond cognitive understanding or recognition of the patient’s 
condition because, and in so far as, it involves interpersonal acknowledgement of the suffering 
of a person as such in the clinical encounter.2 As Giladri and Stanghellini’s conversation show, 
settling the treatment outcome in isolation from the person’s life-world not only fails to 
acknowledge part of the patient’s suffering. In ignoring the shape of one’s life-world, an 
important aspect of the first-personal sense of being understood as a person may also be undermined; 
acknowledging suffering as part of the wider practical context of a person’s life as the person 
they are is, I claim, also an important aspect of the first-personal sense of being understood as a 
 
2 Ratcliffe’s (2017) account of empathetic openness as a source of knowledge about patients’ 
experiences of illness and health in psychopathology is offered as an alternative to Goldman’s 
(2016, 2011) deployment of the simulation theory of mind in cognitive science. Following Goldie 
(2011), Ratcliffe argues against the simulation theory on the grounds that even if empathy, directing 
one’s attention towards the other person, involves a quasi-like perception of what the other person 
experiences, such empathetic apprehension of the other person operates in conjunction with an 
importantly different ‘second-person experience’ of illness. Due to the limitations of scope, I take no 
stand here on the plausibility of Goldman’s version of the simulation theory as such.   
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transformative tool in recovery – of being visible and present to the other as me as such in the 
existential context of vulnerability. 
The importance of the patient’s status of being understood (or not) speaks directly, I 
maintain, to a key motivation for thinking of narrative as tool for the development of a positive 
therapeutic relationship in a context of trust and, where necessary, empowerment for positive 
change. What my account adds to this familiar claim about therapeutic empathy is that, while 
such choices are revelatory or expressive of a distinctly first-personal stance, they do not 
constitute or determine self-hood and self-interpretation in fixed way. On my use of the idea of 
narrative structure in self-understanding, the relevant sense of ‘narrative’ is instead treated as a 
transcendental condition, as opposed to a feature of the object of evaluation itself. And the 
reason is that one can also adopt a second-personal stance on one’s own experience and address 
oneself, where the relationship between the first- and the second-personal narrative perspective 
on experience and self-understanding is itself a dynamic and open-ended evaluative process. Such 
reorientation of focus makes available a new perspective of the narrative task of self-
understanding in schizophrenia as a potentially transformative concept in the ethics of 
recognition, conceived as a dialectical movement in giving uptake to the other.3 
 
 




3 I borrow the term “uptake” from Austin’s (1975) speech act theory. My use of the term in 
accounting for the significance of narrative understanding and perspective taking in our capacity 
to talk together owes much to the analytic origin of a descriptive rather than prescriptive 
methodology of ordinary language philosophy, but I am not able to defend this claim here. For 
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